Negligence
A barrel of lour fell from an open door on an upper floor of the defendant's warehouse, injuring a passer-by in the street.
This was evidence to go to the jury without further explanation of the defendant's negligence.
Barrels which are properly handled do not generally so fall, and a jury might reasonably infer negligence on the part of the defendant.
If, in a res ipsa loquitur - situation, the defendant does give an explanation to rebut the presumption of negligence that lies on him in such cases it is then for the plaintiff to prove negligence affirmatively if he can.
Caparo Industries plc. v. Dickman 1990
The plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's statement must be reasonable, i.e., highly likely.
Note that negligent misrepresentation is actionable under Hedley Byrne.
This case further developed the HEDLEY BYRNE rule. See also SMITH v. BUSH (1990)
The 'analogy' approach (existence of a duty of care) was upheld. See MURPHY v. BRENTWOOD D.C. (1991)
Donoghue v. Stephenson 1932 House of Lords
A friend of Mrs. Donoghue's bought her a bottle of ginger beer at a café.
The bottle had been manufactured by Stephenson.
The bottle contained the decomposed remains of a snail.
Mrs. Donoghue became ill.
Plaintiff could claim damages.
Neighbour principle. Take reasonable care of those whom one ought to have in contemplation when acting or omitting.
Leading case from 1932. Negligance/tort principles date back to lex Aquilia.
See also European legislation on product liability.
Hedley Byrne Co. Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd. 1964 House of Lords
Holler (Bankers) carelessly gave favourable references to Hedley about a company to be bought by the latter. Plaintiff lost 17.000 pounds. Defendant had expressly disclaimed responsibility (no suit in contract).
A claim can lie on a careless mis-statement - this is new.
However, the mere probability of injury arising from a mis-statement will not always be enough to found a claim.
Economic loss alone is recoverable under this rule only.
The rule applies to negligent misrepresentation.
The CofA had denied the claim: (1) different from Donoghue v. Stephenson: (a) different act: statement, (b) diferent value: financial loss (=money itself); (2) narrower test than foreseeability necessary: Contract/close relationship.
Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire 1989
A mother claimed on the behalf of her daughter who had been murdered by the notorious Yorkshire killer.
The daughter was the last in a series of murders.
The claim could not be allowed.
There was no close relationship between her and the police (proximity in respect to negligence).
Also public policy would have barred the claim.
Police failed to control stadium crowd. 95 dead. More than 400 injured. Plaintiffs suffered nervous shock resulting in psychiatric disease.
Claims failed.
Responsibility when victim was a) within sight or hearing of immediate aftermath and, b) had a close relationship of love and affection.
Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. 1970
The Home Office was sued by the plaintiffs for damage done to their yacht by borstal boys.
This had happened because prison officers guarding the boys had left them to themselves in close proximity to the plaintiff's anchorage.
The Home Office was held to owe a duty of care.
There was not only reasonable foreseeability of the damage but also proximity (in respect to negligence).
Plaintiff's family injured in road accident caused by defendant. Mrs. McLoughlin suffered nervous shock caused by death of her daughter etc.
For the plaintiff (damages).
Different harm: nervous shock. Liability when suffered in the immediate aftermath.
For nervous shock, Compare:
McWilliams v. Sir William Arrol & Co. Ltd. 1962
A man was killed by falling from a steel tower.
It was alleged that the death was due to the negligence of his employers in failing to supply a safety-belt.
Examination of the facts showed that the essence of the matter really was that even if they had done so the deceased
would not have worn the belt.
The employers were not held liable.
It was not them who caused it.
Co-cause or substitute cause?
Compare:
Murphy v. Brentwood District Council 1991 House of Lords
The courts should use an incremental, analogical approach to deciding the issue of the existence of a duty of care, also with regard 'public policy' as a bar to claims in negligence, rather than a wide-ranging general principal of liability.
Confirmed in
Mutual Life Citizens Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Evatt 1971 Privy Council
An insurance company's policy holders suffered loss by investing in another company in reliance upon a mis-statement as to the financial stability of that company made by one of the insurance company's officials.
The insurance company was not held liable.
Advice about investments is not a part of such a company's business.
The officer did not purport to act as a stockbroker.
This somewhat restrictive approach has not been followed by the English Courts.
Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v. Miller SS Co. Pty. Ltd. (The Wagon Mound (No.2)) 1967 Privy Council
The defendants' engineer released oil into the sea.
Sparks falling upon it set the sea alight, damaging he plaintiff's vessels.
Liability was held to have been established even if the risk that the oil floating on the sea would catch light was by no means great.
Where there is a serious danger to be avoided it may embrace a need to foresee and guard against an improbable event.
The reasonable foresight rule, as developed in
Claim in negligence was made against a barrister in respect of his conduct of a case in court.
Civil action cannot lie against counsel in the conduct of litigation because public policy so demands.
It is essential to the administration of justice that all concerned in a trial should be free to speak and act without fear to subsequent claims.
To permit a claim would be contrary to "policy" (exception to proximity).
The plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's statement must be reasonable, i.e., highly likely.
This case further developed the
Spartan Steel and Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. Ltd. 1873
The defendants, through their negligence, caused a stoppage of electric power in the plaintiff's mill.
The latter could recover for loss of profit arising from physical damage to a "melt" in their furnace caused by the stoppage, but not for loss of profit arising because further business activity had to be postponed.
Pure economic loss is not recoverable unless it results from some physical damage caused by the negligence.Or, if it comes under the
HEDLEY BYRNE rule.